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Carl Lindahl
Ancient epic presents worn faces, but seldom shows the minds they hide. 
In the world’s oldest story, emotions surface visually, unaided by revelations of the 
characters’ thoughts: “tears streamed” on the face of Gilgamesh as he mourned his 
best friend. The hero wept “six days and seven nights” until his face,“weathered 
by cold and heat,” became “like that of a man who has gone on a long journey” 
(Gardner and Meier 1984:166, 168, 210, 212). Ancient epic depicts gigantic actions 
without naming their causes and motivations. “Like a lioness whose whelps are 
lost,” grieving Gilgamesh “paces back and forth”; “he tears off. . . and throws down 
his fi ne clothes like things unclean” (ibid.:187-88). In The Iliad, written down a 
thousand years after Gilgamesh, grieving Achilleus groans like “some great bearded 
lion when some man. . . has stolen his cub” and dirties his clothes, scattering “black 
ashes over his immortal tunic” (Lattimore 1951:18.23-25, 318-23).
Throughout the fi rst millennium of surviving literature, epic explained 
love, death, strength, and suffering as the products of monstrous gods—present 
sometimes as voices, sometimes in the full vision of their godhead. Such descriptions 
and images lead Julian Jaynes—in his book, The Origin of Consciousness in the 
Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind (1976)—to posit that the ancients could describe 
their own bodies, but could not examine the content of their own minds; that they 
performed actions without knowing their motivations; that, because of the dual 
nature of their thought processes, they habitually hallucinated the voices and forms 
of the gods that directed their actions. Such poems as Gilgamesh and The Iliad are 
therefore the literal records of what ancient people experienced—accounts little 
altered by fi ction, faulty memory, theology, imagination, or artistry.
Jaynes presents epic imagery as the major surviving evidence of the era 
of the bicameral mind, when the “hallucinatory area” in the right lobe of the 
brain—corresponding to Wernicke’s area in the left—generated poetry and visions, 
producing an archaic and incomplete form of consciousness. As Wernicke’s area 
now generates speech, the hallucinatory 
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area generated inner voices. Signals from the hallucinatory area seemed to come 
from outside the body; thus they were interpreted in life and in literature as voices 
and visions of divine beings that controlled human fate. Actions were portrayed 
without motivations and heroes’ minds were not inspected because people were 
not yet conscious of their own consciousness. Only when Wernicke’s area and the 
left cerebral hemisphere began to exercise the greater power and the hallucinatory 
area became more or less vestigial did the process of introspective consciousness 
begin.
Yet there is another sort of evidence that cannot be ignored. The same sort 
of imagery cited by Jaynes as proof of preconscious thought is found universally in 
archaic aural literature—whenever recorded—as well as in most recently recorded 
oral art, wherever practiced in the world. The “incomplete” perceptual record of 
Gilgamesh and The Iliad can be simply explained as part of an oral aesthetic, an 
aesthetic rooted in the fact that all oral poets share certain imperatives: they must 
always perform their work, and in so doing engage constantly the imagination of 
their audiences.
 Roger D. Abrahams proposes a list of three imagistic universals in oral 
art: 1) overstatement and understatement, 2) concrete and specifi c language, and 
3) translation of idea and emotion into action and symbol.1 All three generate such 
imagery as is found in Gilgamesh and The Iliad.  Consider two stanzas, one from a 
nineteenth-century English ballad, one from a recent Afro-American blues. In the 
ballad, a mourning man lets his plan of action express the nature of his grief:
I’ll do as much for my sweetheart
 As any young man may;
I’ll sit and mourn all on her grave
 For a twelvemonth and a day.2
In this fl oating blues stanza, a man dramatizes his wife’s greed:
1 Abrahams and Foss 1968:7-11. Abrahams confines himself principally to the study of 
British-American oral poetry, but I have applied his analysis to the poems of the thirteen cultures 
represented in Finnegan 1978. Although there is considerable variation from culture to culture (e.g., 
Yoruba and Hopi artists almost invariably translate emotion into action and symbol, while Eskimo 
poets tend to express emotion more directly), all thirteen cultures translated idea and emotion into 
action and symbol with notably greater frequency than the literary poets (Wordsworth, Shelley, 
Whitman, and Longfellow) I examined for purposes of comparison.
2 Stanza 2 of “The Unquiet Grave” (Child 78) in a version recorded in Friedman 1956:32-
34. For a brief discussion of the power of this ballad to express indirectly the mixed and otherwise 
unspeakable emotions of mourners, see Lindahl 1986.
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She takes all my money, throws it against the wall;
She gives me what sticks and keeps what falls.3
Both passages employ understatement and overstatement, but in a very specifi c way, 
overstating action to the point of near-parody but leaving no room for explanation 
or emotion. Moreover, both images are concrete expressions of ideas that could 
as easily have been rendered abstractly. Thus, both images fulfi ll Abrahams’ fi nal 
criterion, which could be called the master trope of oral art: the translation of idea 
and emotion into action and symbol. This is the most concise way of expressing 
how all three rules produce their effects.
Another way of saying the same thing is that oral poetry tends to be unglossed: 
listeners are presented a striking picture, but each must individually caption it, and 
draw personal conclusions concerning the ideas and emotions implicit in the poem. 
There is evidence that oral artists not only avoid, but disdain the glossing of their 
images. Bluesmen and blues fans have commented on the lack of artistry in the 
blues imitations of the Rolling Stones:
The Stones don’t understand how you sing the blues. They don’t understand that 
when you sing about drugs, you really mean sex, and when you sing about sex, 
you really mean drugs. They mix things up and mess up their songs. They don’t 
have any self-control.4
So the oral image, exaggerated as it may seem, is in reality subject to the strictest 
control: in its presentation of emotion and in the metaphorical encoding of its 
message—a message that is meant to stop short of the direct expression of the 
thoughts and feelings that gave rise to the song. 
Perhaps the most important explanation for the prevalence of the unglossed 
oral image lies in the needs of the audience, the ultimate determinant of what songs 
are sung again and again. Worldwide accounts attest that the audience exerts life-
and-death control over a traditional song. In various contexts, unimpressed listeners 
will shout down a performer, or fall asleep, or simply walk away. In some traditions 
the inattentiveness of 
3 Tampa Red is among the many blues musicians who have performed this floating 
stanza.
4 Paraphrase of personal communications made to me by blues fan Arthur Kempton and 
musician Earl Strayhorn during an interview in April 1969 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Among the 
blues artists I have consulted, concrete, uncoded imagery is regarded as a major option, but not as an 
imperative—while some artists express emotion directly in their lyrics, others prefer indirection.
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one listener will end the performance for all.5
The oral artist’s objective, then, is to overcome the passivity of the audience, 
to ensure their complicity and support in creating a successful performance.  Artist 
and audience increase their opportunities for mutual engagement by creating a certain 
aesthetic system, a metaphorical language that ensures that something important 
will remain unsaid, requiring further interpretation. More than merely leaving 
room for listeners to “fi ll in a blank,” unglossed imagery allows a signifi cant range 
of response. As Andrew Welsh has noted (1978:76), “the more precise the poetic 
Image, the less we can limit with prose defi nitions the meanings and emotions 
involved in it.”
Whenever researchers have taken the time to know oral artists, it has been 
shown that the same people who perform concrete, externalized songs—translating 
idea and emotion into action and symbol—are more than capable of introspection, 
that they are acutely conscious of the workings of their own minds, and that they 
can explain very articulately what is going on in their heads and hearts. But it is 
simply not their aesthetic choice or rhetorical strategy to make such explanations 
within their performances.
This point is made dramatically in Betsy Whyte’s recording of the ballad 
“Young Johnstone” (Child 88). This Scottish singer presents the song in a restrained, 
almost ethereal voice, despite the fact that it describes a murderous central character. 
In the progress of this song, Johnstone—whose “fi rst instinct,” states Francis J. 
Child (1882-98:II, 288), “is as duly to stab as a bulldog’s is to bite”—kills his 
sister’s lover, then his own lover, and fi nally himself. Johnstone’s actions, like 
those of Achilleus and Gilgamesh, are concrete and exaggerated. Betsy Whyte’s 
characters do not look into themselves, and as she sings—almost matter-of-factly—
she leaves no impression that she wishes to examine their minds. Yet as soon as she 
stops singing she adds her own interpretation in emphatic, emotional tones:
I’ve forgotten the last wee bit, but—I know the end. They were supposed to be 
lying together on the fl oor, [solemnly] dead. But—it was [emphatically] true. It 
was really a true—ballad. Well—usually when they said they were true in these 
old times, they were true. He was jealous o her, you see, he was this type, you 
would have tae understand the Johnstons to ken that type. . . .6
5 Among the best records of audiences forcefully editing tellers and singers of tales are 
Lord 1960:esp. 14-17 and Dégh 1969:49-53, 71-119. See also Abrahams 1972.
6 Betsy Whyte’s version of “Young Johnstone,” as well as her comments on the song, are 
recorded in “The Muckle Songs: Classic Scots Ballads,” Tangent TNGM/D, Scottish Tradition 5, 
recorded through the auspices of the School of Scottish Studies, 
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Betsy Whyte has obviously lived with this song. In her mind, there is no doubt 
of its meaning, and hers is not a meaning that most outsiders, including Child, 
would be likely to infer. Her personal and emotion-fi lled reading demonstrates 
beyond doubt that she is fully capable of supplying feelings and motivations for the 
ballad characters. But, again, not one hint of this interpretation emerges in her sung 
presentation. Betsy Whyte has chosen to separate what she considers to be a great 
song from her deeply personal experience of it. 
In suppressing her own vision of Johnstone, Betsy Whyte is fi lling a great 
communicative need. Recent psychological experiments, though far from settled on a 
single interpretation, point toward, if not yet inevitably to, the following conclusions. 
First, an oral image is much more likely than a visual image to spur an audience to 
create mental images. Second, listeners will respond more quickly and dramatically 
to concrete than to abstract language. Third, listeners will also remember concrete 
images longer than abstract ones. Finally, the images that listeners remember 
longest and most vividly are voluntary—that is, images that emerge from one’s 
own imagination rather than in response to the specifi c instructions of a speaker. 
Taken together, these fi ndings suggest that sharp but sparse and open-ended oral 
images will create the strongest and longest-remembered response of any form of 
poetic communication.7
To bolster his claim that the ancients could not read their own minds, Julian 
Jaynes can offer no more powerful evidence than concrete poetic imagery—the 
same kind of unglossed pictures favored by today’s aural artists. Yet contemporary 
singers possess great powers of introspection; they simply recognize that the 
strength of their art lies in avoiding interpretation. In explaining how she performs 
such dramatic ballads as “Mary Hamilton” (Child 185), Almeda Riddle (West 1986) 
insists on distance: “Get behind the song. If you get behind it, they’ll see it. If you 
get in front of it, they’ll just see you and get disgusted.” The listener’s greatest 
power is the power to be suggested to. Only by thus empowering the audience does 
the oral artist maintain the right toperform.
University of Houston
Edinburgh. An accompanying booklet provides a transcription of Betsy Whyte’s remarks. Emphasis 
is found in the original transcription; I have slightly altered the punctuation of that version.
7 These four conclusions are supported by the following articles: Begg et al. 1978; Dickel 
and Slak 1983; Doll 1983; Jamieson and Schimpf 1980. See also Morris and Hampson 1983:240-
99.
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